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Abstract.  In  this  study,  we  analyze  firms’  membership  in  R&D  (Research  and 
Development) cooperation networks. Our main research hypothesis is that the membership 
in cooperation networks is related to the degree of the knowledge spillover. The approach 
focus on both cost symmetry and cost asymmetry. For that purpose, our work is developed 
in two tasks: we first develop an analytical model with three stages: in the first, firms 
decide  whether  to  participate  in  a  cooperative  research  network;  in  the  second  they 
simultaneously  choose  the  level  of  R&D  output,  and  finally  firms  choose  the  level  of 
output through Cournot competition under both cost symmetry and cost asymmetry. Then 
we proceed with computational simulations in order to verify our hypothesis. From our 
results, we were able to conclude that cooperation leads to an improvement on RJV firms’ 
position  in  the  market  as  it  allows  them  to  produce  more  than  others  with  the  same 
production conditions. Additionally, cooperating firms have to spend fewer resources on 
research, which turns the network a tremendous success on the productive efficiency level.  
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1.  Introduction 
In recent years, cooperation networks is one of the most appealing topics to study, gathering 
researchers from different scientific fields, such as economy, management, computer science, 
as well as politicians and entrepreneurs. 
It is generally recognized that R&D (Research and Development) activities have some public 
good features, as firms cannot fully appropriate the returns of their R&D investments, due to 
the existence of R&D spillovers.2 As a result, R&D expenditures are usually less than socially 
optimal. For this reason, R&D cooperation frequently emerges, so as to internalize spillovers. 
Cooperation  in  R&D  is  usually  identified  with  research  collaboration  and  it  is  often 
investigated in the context of two-stage oligopoly models in which firms make their R&D 
decisions in a first pre-competitive stage and their quantity/price setting in a second stage. The 
most influential article on R&D cooperation is due to d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988), 
who assumed that there are spillovers in R&D output. Another prominent work is Kamien et 
al. (1992), which proposed spillovers in R&D expenditures and allowed for different R&D 
organization models that may involve R&D expenditures cartelization and/or full information 
sharing. 
Since these starting articles, a lot of scientific models emerged around the topic of R&D 
cooperation, providing numerous extensions to those original models. Particularly interesting 
are  the  extensions  to  an  oligopolistic  scenario  with  industry-wide  agreements  (Suzumura, 
1992)  or  partial  industry  agreements  (Poyago-Theotoky,  1995).  Other  authors  considered 
diverse degrees of spillover between cooperating firms (Vonortas, 1994), both inter and intra-
industry R&D spillovers (Steurs, 1995) or one-way spillovers from the firm with higher R&D 
activity to its rival (Amir and Wooders, 2000). Other approaches introduce the concept of 
absorptive capacity, which means that each firm needs to conduct its own R&D in order to 
realize spillovers from other firms' R&D activity (Cohen and Levinthal, 1989; Kamien and 
Zang, 2000). Alternatively, some papers involve dynamic models, as it was the case of Petit 
and Tolwinski (1999), who extended the existing literature on cooperative/competitive R&D 
into  a  context  of  a  dynamic  model.  Also,  other  more  recent  research  studies  have  been 
interested on the same dynamical process of innovation using spillovers and trying to analyze 
                                                            
2 According to Scitovsky (1954), spillovers (or technological externalities) deal with the effects of non-market 
interactions, being realized through processes that affect the production (or profit) function of a firm. Spillovers 
may  respect  to  the  diffusion  of  learning  across  firms,  which  can  take  place  through  interfirm  mobility  of 
employees or cooperation. 3 
 
the impact on welfare, studying the private and social incentives of R&D cooperation (Cellini 
and Lambertini, 2009).   
Many  also  used  the  differentiation  through  asymmetry,  namely  in  costs  and  spillovers  to 
observe the behaviour of firms when facing these kinds of constraints. In Atallah (2005) or 
Atallah (2007) we observe asymmetry in spillovers (and not cost asymmetry, as in this work).  
Most of the research on R&D cooperation is theoretical, but empiric analysis is also possible 
and desirable. If intuitively and theoretically we can predict benefits from cooperation, only 
from empirics we can assure that these benefits are real. Some interesting studies try to depict 
the results of R&D cooperation, which is the case of Aschhoff and Schmidt (2008), where 
they  observe  the  effects  of  R&D  cooperation  on  future  innovation  and  firms’  efficiency 
improvement that lead to better economic performances.   
We may also refer that there are few empirical studies that aim at studying the effects of 
production conditions and spillover degrees over cooperation among firms. One of the most 
relevant studies is the one developed by Cassiman and Veugelers (2002) that show the effects 
of incoming spillovers and appropriability on having cooperation. Using data from Belgium 
they found that incoming spillovers have a positive and significant effect on the probability of 
cooperating firms. They also found that the higher appropriability, the higher the probability 
of network cooperation. However, they showed that it may depend on the kind of partners that 
firms deal with in the market. In addition, some non-spillover determinants of cooperation are 
also examined, and they found that larger firms are more likely to cooperate. 
Starting  from  the  literature  on  R&D  cooperation,  in  our  study  we  intend  to  analyze  the 
membership and profitability of cooperation networks. Our main research hypothesis is that 
membership in cooperation network is associated with the degree of spillover. Therefore, this 
approach tries to offer a (less typical) extension to the analysis of R&D cooperation for more 
than  2  asymmetric  costs  firms.  So,  its  main  value  are  the  extension  of  the  number  of 
companies  that  exist  in  the  market,  the  consideration  of  asymmetric  marginal  costs  of 
productions, as well as the computational simulation of the interactions, and the results that 
emerge from it.  
Our work is, then, developed in two parts, each of them divided in two steps. In the first part, 
we assumed that firms are symmetric in what respects the marginal cost of production, R&D 
costs and the spillover outside the network. In the second part, we considered that firms may 4 
 
have  different  marginal  costs  of  production.  As  for  the  steps  of  each  part,  we  propose 
developing (i) an analytical model, followed by (ii) a computational approach that finds a 
numerical solution to verify our hypothesis.  
 
2.  Part I – R&D Cooperation Networks under symmetric marginal costs 
In the first level, we made an analytical solution for the problem of R&D cooperation by 
extending the model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) to an oligopolistic scenario with 
partial-industry agreements between symmetric firms. We then developed a three-stage game 
where firms decide about entering in the R&D cooperation network, then about its R&D 
expenditures and afterwards they compete in the output market.  
After developing the model, and due to the complexity of the solution for the equilibrium 
R&D  output,  we  decided  to  use  numerical  simulations.  Therefore  we  consider  both  a 
repetition  of  the  game  by  introducing  a  numerical  solution  through  an  Agent-Based 
Simulation. The firms are represented by heterogeneous agents that possess distinct profit 
levels and whose decisions are based on individual preferences. We measure the profits of the 
firms in two different periods of time and conclude that there is an association between the 
participation in cooperation networks and the corresponding profitability in the long run. 
 
2.1. The Model 
There are n firms that produce a homogeneous output, whose inverse demand function is 
given by 
bQ a P - =   (1) 
where the parameter a captures the dimension of the market and b is a constant. Q is the total 








) (a, b>0 and Q ≤ a/b). 
(2) 
As it is typical in R&D cooperation models (e.g. d'Aspremont and Jacquemin, 1988), we will 







j i i i x x c b a  
(3) 
where  i a  accounts for stand-alone marginal costs (0 <  i a  < a) and xi measures firm i's R&D 
output. Each firm also benefits from the R&D developed by other firms through a spillover, b 
Î  [0,  1].  Additionally,  it  will  be  assumed  that  there  are  diminishing  returns  to  R&D 









Additionally,  and  as  in  d'Aspremont  and  Jacquemin  (1988),  we  will  consider  a  specific 
functional form for the R&D cost function: 
C(xi) = 0,5γxi²   (5) 
The profit of firm i is then given by: 
) ( ) ( i i i i x C q c P - - = p = 
2
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It is proposed a three-stage game, where firms decide about cooperation, R&D output level 
and afterwards select the level of output non-cooperatively. The timing is the following: 
In the first stage (membership stage), firms decide whether to participate in a cooperative 
research network. For simplicity, we will assume that within the cooperative network, the 
degree of information sharing is set at its maximum level (b=1), a structure known in the 
literature  as  Research  Joint  Venture  (RJV)  (Kamien  et  al,,  1992).  Additionally,  we  will 
consider that insiders can obstruct the entry of an additional firm if it reduces their profits, 
while an outside firm will join the RJV only if it increases its profits. Therefore, the following 
conditions3 ensure the stability of a RJV of size m: 
                                                            
3 The stability conditions here used are similar to those usually adopted in the literature (e.g. Poyago-Theotoky, 
1995; Atallah, 2003). 6 
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where 
m
i p (t) represents the profit of an insider and 
m n
i
- p (t) the profit of an outsider when the 
RJV is of size t. 
m
i p (m) represents the average profit of firms in a network of size m and 
m
i p
(m-1) represents the average profit of firms in a network of size m, not taking into account 
one specific firm. 
In  the  second  stage  (development  stage),  firms  simultaneously  choose  the  level  of  R&D 
output,  independently  or  under  cooperation.  If  firms  cooperate,  then  they  will  coordinate 
R&D output in order to maximize joint profits. 
At  last,  in the  production  stage,  firms  simultaneously  choose  the  level  of  output through 
Cournot competition.  
 
2.2. Analytical Solution 
We  will  assume  that  m  firms  join  the  Research  Joint  Venture  (RJV) and  maximize  joint 
profits. As mentioned before, there is full information sharing between the RJV participants 
(b = 1), while for the remaining (n-m) firms, b Î (0, 1). Additionally, we will assume that 
firms are symmetric, that is,  i a = c, " i. 
Second-stage Cournot profits for an RJV – firm come: 
  (10) 
where C stands for cooperating and  N for non-cooperating firms. 
Additionally, a non-RJV-firm will have Cournot profits equal to: 
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In the R&D stage, firms must decide about its R&D output under cooperation or competition. 
From Cournot profits maximization and by imposing symmetry, the R&D output equilibrium 
for both cooperating (x
C) and non-cooperating (x
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Due to the complexity of the solution for the equilibrium R&D output, we decide to use 
numerical simulations that we explore in the following section. 
 
2.3. Numerical Results 
In order to obtain numerical results to test our hypothesis, an algorithm has been implemented 
using  R  language  (R  Development  Core  Team,  2005).  The  outline  of  the  algorithm  is 
presented in the appendix 1. First, we start with the initialization of the main parameters of the 
model. There are many parameters to initialize in the simulation and it would be fastidious to 
describe all the set up choices. Focusing on the main parameters that have been initialized: 
a=80; C=50;  g = (8*(n+1)^2)/27+10 (according to Poyago-Theotoky, 1995); n = 5 (number 
of firms in the market) and m = 2 (number of firms in the network). 
To  make  the  algorithm  work  it  is  necessary  to  establish  initial  values  for  the  number  of 
repetitions of the cycle. We set up Generations = 20. 
In Table 1 some results of the simulation for different values of n (number of firms in the 
market) are presented. 8 
 
Marginal cost=50
Beta (β) -           0.2 0.4 0.6 0.81 0.9
RJV Profits 46,72      48,73      50,25      51,25      51,73      51,76     
Non-RJV profits 24,28      24,76      25,17      25,50      25,75      25,83     
RJV Profits for (n-1) RJV firms 74,07      76,06      77,56      78,57      79,07      79,10     
RJV R&D output   0,16        0,16        0,16        0,16        0,16        0,16       
Non-RJV R&D output 0,41        0,35        0,28        0,21        0,15        0,12       
RJV Profits for (n+1) RJV firms 24,50      25,08      25,48      25,71      25,75      25,71     
Marginal cost=50
Beta (β) -           0.2 0.4 0.6 0.81 0.91
RJV Profits 3,99        4,04        4,07        4,09        4,10        4,09       
Non-RJV profits 2,02        2,04        2,04        2,05        2,05        2,05       
RJV Profits for (n-1) RJV firms 5,99        6,06        6,11        6,14        6,14        6,14       
RJV R&D output   0,02        0,02        0,02        0,02        0,02        0,02       
Non-RJV R&D output 0,02        0,01        0,01        0,01        0,00        0,00       
RJV Profits for (n+1) RJV firms 2,02        2,03        2,05        2,05        2,05        2,05       
Marginal cost=50 and R&D cost (γ)=50
Beta (β) -           0.2 0.4 0.6 0.81 0.91
RJV Profits 48,90      49,58      50,09      50,42      50,58      50,59     
Non-RJV profits 24,75      24,92      25,06      25,17      25,25      25,28     
RJV R&D output   0,05        0,11        0,11        0,11        0,11        0,11       
Non-RJV R&D output 0,14        0,11        0,09        0,07        0,05        0,04       
Marginal cost=50 and R&D cost (γ)=90
Beta (β) -           0.2 0.4 0.6 0.81 0.91
RJV Profits 49,34      49,75      50,05      50,25      50,35      50,35     
Non-RJV profits 24,85      24,95      25,03      25,10      25,15      25,17     
RJV R&D output   0,03        0,07        0,07        0,07        0,07        0,07       





Table 1: Results of the simulation for different values of n (number of firms in the market) 
 
Firstly, we can see that all firms outside the RJV want to enter the network and firms inside 
the RJV let them enter. The network then is formed by all firms in the market. There is 
stability when all firms are inside the network and therefore there is no entrance or exit of 
firms to and from the RJV. Whatever is the number of companies in the market and for every 
spillover levels, companies will sooner or later enter in the RJV and there will be a huge 
cooperation network between all companies in the market, after interaction starts.   
From our computational exercise, we first observe that there is a direct relationship between 
the R&D spillover that exists outside the network (b) and firms’ profit (Figure 1).  In fact, we 
may conclude that an increase of the R&D spillover outside the RJV will make firms to 
benefit from other firms’ knowledge, and, therefore, to increase its profits. And this is true for 
both RJV and non-RJV firms, while in the first case, profits are higher due to a maximum 9 
 
spillover among cooperating firms. Also, a correlation coefficient of 0,997 between spillover 
and firms’ profit was found to be statistically significant at 0.05 level of significance. 
 
 
Figure 1: Profits evolution with the spillover between non-cooperating firms (beta) 
 
Additionally, when we focus on the R&D investment, we observe that it is higher for non-
cooperating  firms  when  compared  with  cooperating  firms,  except  for  a  high  degree  of 
information sharing among non-cooperating firms (Figure 2). At the same time, we observe 
that for non cooperating firms, there is an inverse relationship between the level of knowledge 
spillover  and  the  investment  in  R&D.  This  result  is  rather  intuitive:  higher  degrees  of 
information sharing means lower appropriateness of R&D efforts and, therefore, lower R&D 
investments: 
 























































We also observe that as the R&D cost (g) increases, each firm’s profit also increases, but with 
a higher effect on the RJV firms than for the case of no cooperation (Figure 3). This might be 




Figure 3: Profits evolution under R&D costs increasing 
 
In what concerns the investment in R&D, it appears to decrease abruptly with small R&D cost 
values but then it has smaller reductions for greater values of R&D cost (Figure 4). This 
phenomenon may explain the evolution of the profits since the evolution of the investment 
compensates the increase of its cost. 
 
 























































Now, if we change the parameter a (related with demand size) we observe a positive change 
of the profits (Figure 5). This change was indeed expected, as when the dimension of the 
market increases, the profit increases as well. The investment in R&D also increases in both 
groups (RJV and non-RJV), and we observe that firms outside the network (non-RJV) invest 
more than firms inside the RJV. 
 
 
Figure 5: Evolution of R&D output when the market size increases (a) 
 
Finally, we repeat the simulation for different number of firms in the market (n) and observe 
that when n increases, the R&D output decreases (Figure 6). This fact can be explained by the 
inverse relationship between the R&D output and the spillover. Therefore, as the number of 
firms in the market increases the R&D output decreases due to the fact that the spillover is 
greater for larger number of firms in the market and the need for R&D output is lower. 
 
























































n=number of firms in the market12 
 
3.  Part II – R&D Cooperation Networks under asymmetric marginal costs 
In this second section we develop an analytical solution for the problem of R&D cooperation, 
maintaining the key assumptions of the model of d'Aspremont and Jacquemin (1988) and 
extend it to an oligopolistic scenario with partial-industry agreements between asymmetric-
costs firms. We assume that these companies have asymmetric marginal costs of production, 
although the spillover and the R&D cost are identical for every firm. As in the former part, we 
developed a three-stage game where firms decide about entering in the R&D cooperation, 
then about its R&D expenditures and finally they compete in the output market.  
To  develop  the  analytical  model,  due  to  its  complexity  as  the  solution  was  exceedingly 
complex  and  extremely  difficult  to  solve  without  technological  help,  we  use  numerical 
simulations to find the solution for the equilibrium R&D output. Therefore we consider both a 
repetition  of  the  game  by  introducing  a  numerical  solution  through  an  Agent-Based 
Simulation  similar  to  the  previous  process  in  part  I.  The  firms  are  represented  by 
heterogeneous agents that possess distinct marginal costs of production and whose decisions 
are based on individual preferences. We measure the profits of the firms in two different 
periods of time and analyze if there is an association between the membership in cooperating 
networks and the corresponding profitability in the long run. 
We consider nine firms, because the electronic resources only had capacity to derivate the 
model equations with less than ten companies. Each firm have a different marginal cost of 
production ∝ , for i = 1, …, 9 and equal R&D costs. The spillover is also equal for every firm 
outside the network although its value was not fixed. Inside the network the spillover was set 
equal to one, just like in the first part.  
With these new hypotheses we determine the new company cost function, which is almost 
similar to the previous one but with asymmetric marginal costs. After that we determine all 
the new equilibrium equations necessary to calculate the R&D output and the output of each 
firm. 
 
3.1. The  Model 
In this second model we consider both equations 1 and 2, showed and explained in part I’s 
model. Equation 3 change according to the hypothesis considered above, which means that it 13 
 
now measures the impact of the existence of diverse marginal costs of production between 






j i i i x x c b a     3’) 
i a , as in part I, accounts for stand-alone marginal costs (0 <  i a  < a) and xi measures firm i's 
R&D output. The R&D spillover keeps the same properties, b Î [0, 1], and as written before, 
it will be assumed that there are diminishing returns to R&D expenditures, that is, C′(xi) > 0 
and C′′(xi) > 0. 
The subsequent equations 4 and 5 did not change too. Equation 6 changes because of the 
adjustment of the third equation. So, the profit function has change so that it reflects the 
differences on marginal costs of production between firms:  
) ( ) ( i i i i x C q c P - - = p = 
2
1






j x q x x q b a g b a - + + - - = ∑ ∑
¹ =
                           (6’) 
It is proposed the same three-stage game used in Part I, where firms decide about cooperation, 
R&D output level and then select the level of output non-cooperatively. We use the same 
assumptions of Part I on the membership issue: non-members only want to enter the network 
if their profit increases with their entrance, while members want to leave the network if their 
profit increases by being out the network.  However, in this Part we assume three different 
decision criteria on the members’ decision of letting non-members enter or not the network. 
Each  one  of  these  three  options  is  used  to  find  out  how  network  formation  can  present 
different features by changing this condition. The three possibilities were:  
(1)   The average profit inside the network must increase with the entrance of a 
non-member firm; 
(2)  The profit of the firm that will enter must be superior to the network average 
profit;  
(3)  The profit of the firm with highest income (a kind of “leader” firm) must keep 
the same or increase with the entrance of a new member. 14 
 
3.2. Analytical Solution 
As before, we perform the analytical solution by considering only nine firms because of the 
difficult on calculation. These firms may join the Research Joint Venture (RJV) and maximize 
joint profits. There is full information sharing between the RJV participants (b = 1), while for 
the remaining (n-m) firms, b Î (0, 1).  
The R&D output that results from the solution on a second-stage Cournot for cooperating 
firms is defined by: 
        
  =    , , ,  
 ,  
          (14) 
with   
  meaning the R&D output of a firm in the network. As for   
 , this parameter recalls 
the marginal cost of an outside firm, while   
 , is the one for RJV firms. And the same applies 
to the non-cooperating firms: 
        
  =    , , ,  
 ,  
          (15) 
where   
  is the R&D output of a non-member. The other variables have the same meaning as 
the ones referred above. For calculating the output of each firm we have also to compute the 
equations for each case, as the number of firms in the network changes. For instance, when 
we have 2 companies in the network and the others outside it, the equations for firm one 
(cooperating) and three (non-cooperating) are: 
          
  =  ( , ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 )        (16) 
with   
  equal to the output produced by a company belonging to the R&D network, and 
          
  =  ( , ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 ,  
 )        (17)  
where   
  represents the output produced by a non-member of the network. 
Due to the complexity of the solution for the equilibrium R&D output, and as we did in the 
previous part, we decide to use numerical simulations. We explore them in the next section. 
 
3.3. Numerical Results 
We  use  the  same  structure  of  the  first  algorithm,  and  again  it  was  implemented  using  R 
language (R Development Core Team, 2005). The outline of the algorithm is presented in the 15 
 
appendix 2. First, we started with the initialization of the main parameters of the model, the 
values a, b of equation (1), the spillover (b) of the firms outside the network, and all the other 
relevant values to set up the simulation..The main parameters have been initialized in the 
following manner: a=80, g =100, n=9 (number of firms in the market), m=2 (number of firms 
in the network). 
As said previously, to make the algorithm work it is necessary to establish some initial values 
for the number of repetitions of the cycle, and we set Generations = 20.From the simulations 
made we obtain very interesting results on the behaviour of firms and also we get a significant 
amount of data that was very useful to understand the gains and the differences between 
cooperating and non-cooperating firms. Regarding firms’ asymmetry, it is possible to say that, 
in general, firms with low marginal production costs have higher profits, produce more output 
and are those who do more research, which means that they have higher R&D output. The 
R&D output values tend to grow when the spillover decreases, which means an increasing 
necessity of research because the less the spillover the less know-how spreading between 
firms, so they have to produce more R&D output in order to reduce production costs. 
We then test some combinations of firms, with different marginal costs of production, in order 
to evaluate if there are some changes in the firms within the network. Not in all combinations 
but in most of them, network stability occurred for low levels of spillover. This means that 
when the spillover reaches a lower level, firms prefer to join the R&D network in order to 
benefit from a total share of research output and then have less production costs and so higher 
profits,  contrasting  with  same  background  firms.  The  network  advantages  make  possible 
firms with the same marginal costs of production have different profits, as the ones inside the 
RJV reduce more their production costs due to R&D output spread between them.  
A relevant fact is that some networks are formed by a mix of firms with better and worse 
production skills. Therefore, with some exceptions, cooperation takes place not only between 
firms with high or low efficiency, but they are formed by middle marginal cost companies or 
joint “extreme marginal cost” firms where the ones with the lowest production efficiency are 
the most benefited by cost reduction. 
On the profits issue, we can state that they tend to diminish with the fall of the spillover since 
the marginal production costs are not so reduced by efficiency achievements. Only if the firm 16 
 
belongs to the RJV then its profit increases in the first moment when the company joins the 
network.  
 
3.3.1.  Experiment Results 
From all the data we select just an example to help us to show the conclusions reached on the 
R&D cooperation. In the following tables we sum up the results of one of the experiments 
where it is considered the first RJV joining criterion and where it is possible to confirm all the 
conclusions made. It was taken a group of companies that have different marginal costs of 10, 
20 and 5. We verify that there is network formation for levels of spillover below 0.29, while 
for higher values it is profitable for companies not to cooperate. When 0.29 is reached, two of 
the more efficient firms (7
th, 8
th) join a network with a less efficient firm - the 4
th.  
 











0,75  419,84  421,04  419,84  110,29  110,29  110,29  649,43  649,43  649,43 
0,5  417,71  419,61  417,71  109,21  109,21  109,21  646,77  646,77  646,77 
0,3  416,28  416,28  416,28  109,73  108,40  108,40  645,09  645,09  645,09 
0,29  415,85  415,85  415,85  112,92  108,18  108,18  655,64  655,64  644,56 
0,27  415,29  415,29  426,33  107,88  107,88  107,88  657,44  657,44  643,88 
0,1  412,64  412,64  428,04  106,39  106,39  106,39  659,41  659,41  640,75 
0,03  411,39  411,39  428,80  105,69  105,69  105,69  660,28  660,28  639,28 
Table 2: Firm’s profits determined on the simulation experiments made. 
 
In  table  2  we  can  observe  that  firms  with  the  same  initial  parameters  attain  a  different 
profitable situation, as 7
th and 8
th have higher profits (655.64>644.56) than the 9
th firm, as 
well  as  the  less  efficient  firm  (112.92>108.18)  has  higher  profits  than  the  other  equally 
inefficient firms. Profits, as noticed before, for all firms tend to decrease when they are not in 
a RJV. For example, firm number 1 with marginal cost of 10 has firstly a profit of 419.84 
(spillover=0.75) and it diminishes till 411.39 (spillover = 0.03). The same happens to the 
other firms. But, when they join the network, because of the gains in R&D cooperation, their 
profits tend to increase. For example, firm number 3 earns 415.85 when spillover equals 0.29 17 
 
but when it joins the network, for spillover values of 0.27 and less, its profits boost to 426.33 
and more. This is one of the possible trends that RJV firm profits take, but is not the only one, 
as in other experiments RJV firms see their profits decrease. Nevertheless, their profits are 
still  higher  than  the  ones  from  companies  outside  the  RJV  with  the  same  production 
conditions. 
Concerning the R&D output, we can notice that it has a propensity to increase as a result of a 
diminishing spillover (Table 3). Nevertheless, if some firms start a cooperation arrangement 
their R&D output decreases, as a result of the full knowledge sharing benefit that the network 
agreement provides. As they will share all the research they make, they will not spend so 
many resources on R&D production and then their in-house R&D output decreases. We also 
see that R&D output decreases with the entrance in the network but it still increases if the 
spillover decreases outside the network. This happens because firms will have to invest more 
so  that  they  can  maintain  themselves  producing  in  the  market,  and  also  because  their 
investment will almost not flow to other firms outside the network. Since the spillover is low, 
which decreases free riding behaviour, firms that would invest less in R&D are obliged to 
increase their R&D output.  
 











0,75  0,06  0,06  0,06  0,03  0,03  0,03  0,08  0,08  0,08 
0,5  0,10  0,10  0,10  0,05  0,05  0,05  0,13  0,13  0,13 
0,3  0,14  0,14  0,14  0,07  0,07  0,07  0,17  0,17  0,17 
0,29  0,14  0,14  0,14  0,06  0,07  0,07  0,13  0,13  0,17 
0,27  0,14  0,14  0,11  0,07  0,07  0,07  0,14  0,14  0,17 
0,1  0,17  0,17  0,13  0,09  0,09  0,09  0,16  0,16  0,21 
0,03  0,18  0,18  0,14  0,09  0,09  0,09  0,18  0,18  0,22 
Table 3: Firm’s R&D output determined on the simulation experiments made. 
 
We then can clearly demonstrate that it augments when the spillover drops. As we can state 
by looking again at firm 1, we can observe that its output, when the spillover is 0.75, is much 
higher than when the spillover is 0.03. It also happens to firm 5 although the total output is 18 
 
lower than the total output of firm one (0.06>0.03 once spillover is 0.75 and 0,18>0.09 once 
spillover is 0.03). 
Finally, regarding the output produced we see that it depends on the type of firms existing in 
the group, more precisely, the asymmetry between firms’ marginal cost of production (Table 
4).  In  fact,  when  there  are  firms  with  different  levels  of  efficiency,  those  that  are  more 
productive normally tend to increase their output while the less efficient ones see their output 
reduced. Increasing production costs as a result of less knowledge exchange (spillover) leads 
to less capacity to produce output for companies with low productive skills. However, this 
situation changes if a network arises. If this happens, cooperating firms produce more than in 
a non-cooperation scenario, mainly if compared with other firms with the same parameter 
background.  
 











0,75  20,54  20,54  20,54  10,54  10,54  10,54  25,55  25,55  25,55 
0,5  20,56  20,55  20,56  10,54  10,54  10,54  25,57  25,57  25,57 
0,3  20,56  20,56  20,56  10,50  10,51  10,51  25,58  25,58  25,58 
0,29  20,51  20,51  20,51  10,64  10,46  10,46  25,64  25,64  25,53 
0,27  20,50  20,50  20,68  10,45  10,45  10,45  25,68  25,68  25,52 
0,1  20,47  20,47  20,73  10,39  10,39  10,39  25,73  25,73  25,50 
0,03  20,45  20,45  20,76  10,37  10,37  10,37  25,76  25,76  25,49 
Table 4: Firm’s output determined on the simulation experiments made. 
 
By examining the behaviour of output values, we realize that it normally tends to increase 
when there is no network formation, although some less efficient firms may face a decrease 
on output created. After a RJV arises there is a decrease on output produced by firms outside 
the network and a continuous increase on output from RJV firms. Thus, by looking to the 
example, when the spillover falls from 0.75 to 0.50 the output rise for all firms, but in the next 
phase the output continues to increase for the more efficient firms but it decreases for the less 
efficient  firms.  For  example,  we  see  that,  firstly,  firms  1,  4  and  7  produce  more  output 
(20.56>20.54;  10.54>10.54;  25.57>25.55),  but  when  the  spillover  is  0.3,  for  instance  the 19 
 
output  produced  is  for  firm  one,  four  and  seven  20.56  (<20.56),  10.50(<10.54)  and 
25.58(>25.57), respectively.  
When some firms initiate a cooperative network their output increase and it is higher than the 
one  produced  by  non-cooperating  firms  with  the  same  production  efficiency.  As  we  see 
above, by joining the network, firms 4, 7 and 8 produce more output than before. And as for 
the last two, they continue to increase their output for lower spillover values. This exemplifies 
what was said above about how firms’ output change with the spillover. 
 
3.3.2.  Numerical results for different entering decision criteria     
Companies inside the network have, in this algorithm, the last word on letting or not outside 
firms to enter the network. Three different entering criteria were defined that turned different 
numerical results mostly significant on network stability, as it was explained in section 3.1.  
All the parameters referred above maintain the same properties. The main difference between 
decision criteria is the number of companies that are allowed to enter the network. In some 
experiments the number of firms inside the network is higher when two different criteria are 
compared. 
Generally  it  is  possible to  visualize  which  criterion  is  more  flexible  and  make  easier  the 
entrance of new companies inside the RJV. As we can see in figure 7, the spillover necessary 
to make a network arise is higher for criterion 2, followed by criterion 1 and then 3, the least 
advantageous criterion. We may note that when considering the third criterion, which assumes 
that the profit of the leader firm must not decrease with the entrance of a new member, only in 
four experiments there was a network formed. On the other hand in the experiments with the 
second criterion, where the profit of the entering firm is higher than the network average 
profit, there is always a network formed. Therefore, circumstances necessary to generate a 
RJV are less tough in the second criterion than for the other possible criteria. 20 
 
 
Figure 7: Spillover value needed to form a network for each criterion 
 
Regarding the first criterion used, where the inside companies only let a new firm to enter if 
the average network profit increases after its incoming, there is a high tendency to arise a 
cooperative network. By considering different levels of spillover (Table 5), we may conclude 
that with this kind of decision, the number of firms in the network is usually of 2 and 3: 
 
Network Formation 
Experiments  Costs (1
st to 9
th firm)  Spillover  Number of 
Firms 
1  10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90  0,01  2 
2  10,10,10,40,50,60,90,90,90  0,01  2 
4  40,40,50,50,60,60,70,80,90  0,03  3 
5  80,80,80,80,80,90,90,90,90  0,03  3 
6  90,80,70,60,50,40,30,20,10  0,27  4 
7  10,10,10,20,20,20,5,5,5  0,29  3 
8  20,20,20,20,20,20,5,5,5  0,1  3 
9  1.5,3,4.5,6,7.5,9,10.5,12,13.5  0,18  2 
10  3,3,3,3,3,13.5,13.5,13.5,13.5  0,42  3 
11  13.5,13.5,13.5,13.5,3,3,3,3,3  0,48  3 
Table 5: Spillover and number of firms in the network when using the first entering criterion 
 
About the second decision criterion, where a firm outside the network only enters if its initial 
profit is superior to the network average profit, it presents a bigger number of cases where 
network take place. In the experiments made with this criterion, firms enter on a cooperative 































previous criterion for almost experiments made: there were usually four or more companies 
inside the RJV (Table 6):  
 
Network Formation 
Experiments  Costs (1
st to 9
th firm)  Spillover  Number 
of firms 
1  10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90  0,01  2 
2  10,10,10,40,50,60,90,90,90  0,01  3 
3  5,40,40,40,40,40,40,40,90  0,01  5 
4  40,40,50,50,60,60,70,80,90  0,03  4 
5  80,80,80,80,80,90,90,90,90  0,27  4 
6  90,80,70,60,50,40,30,20,10  0,33  4 
7  10,10,10,20,20,20,5,5,5  0,25  4 
8  20,20,20,20,20,20,5,5,5  0,44  4 
9  1.5,3,4.5,6,7.5,9,10.5,12,13.5  0,3  4 
10  3,3,3,3,3,13.5,13.5,13.5,13.5  0,42  5 
11  13.5,13.5,13.5,13.5,3,3,3,3,3  0,48  4 
Table 6: Spillover and number of firms in the network when using the second criterion 
 
The last criterion is the one with worse results in what respects the network formation (Table 
7).  New  firms  can  only  enter  the  network  if  the  company  having  the  maximum  profit 
maintains the profit at the same value or increases it while the newcomer enters. With this 
harsh criterion, as referred above, only in four cases there is network formation. In table 7 
below  we  see  how  network  formation  works  under  this  criterion  for  experiments  where 
network arises. 
Network Formation 
Experiments  Costs (1
st to 9
th firm)  Spillover  Number of 
firms 
1  10,20,30,40,50,60,70,80,90  0,01  2 
2  10,10,10,40,50,60,90,90,90  0,01  2 
6  90,80,70,60,50,40,30,20,10  0,27  4 
8  20,20,20,20,20,20,5,5,5  0,1  3 
Table 7: Spillover and number of firms in the network when using the third criterion 22 
 
 
We made some statistical tests in order to corroborate the relationships and the effects of the 
variables in the experiments. One–way ANOVA has been computed, considering the effect of 
several values of the marginal cost (here used as a factor/qualitative variable), over the profit 
of  the  firms.  The  overall  null  hypothesis  has  been  rejected  at  0.05  level  of  significance, 
meaning that different marginal costs produce different levels of profits in the firms. Post-hoc 
multiple comparisons tests (Tuckey HSD) have been performed and we were able to conclude 
that lower marginal costs are associated with higher profits.  
We have also compared the profits between networked and non networked firms.  The result 
of the Mann-Whitney test is that statistically significant at 0.05 level of significance, showing 
that there are differences between firms: firms in networks have higher profits than those 
outside the networks. 
 
4.  Final remarks 
In this study, we analyzed the membership in R&D cooperation networks and its impact on 
some  economic  indicators.  Our  main  research  hypothesis  was  that  the  membership  in 
cooperation networks is related to the degree of the knowledge spillover. We first developed 
an analytical model where we considered that production costs were symmetric between all 
companies in the market. We then used numerical simulations to find the solution for the 
equilibrium of R&D output, proceeding in the next moment with computational simulations 
in order to verify our hypothesis. The conclusions obtained were that the profit of firms in the 
network is higher than the corresponding profit outside the network. Additionally, from our 
computational exercise, we may conclude that an increase of the R&D spillover outside the 
RJV  will  make  firms  benefit  from  other  firms’  knowledge,  and,  therefore,  increase  their 
profits. We also observed that as the R&D cost (g) increases, each firm’s profit also increases, 
but with a higher effect on the RJV firms than for the case of no cooperation. Finally, we 
observed that as the number of firms in the market increases, the R&D output decreases due 
to the fact that the spillover is greater for larger number of firms in the market and the need 
for R&D output is inferior. 
However,  has  referred  above,  all  firms  entered  in  the  network  independently  of  the 
environment they face in the market, which does not agree with empirical evidence. So, in 23 
 
order  to  get  more  realistic  results,  a  new  approach  was  attempted  by  introducing  cost 
asymmetry. By doing this we could find that a network, for some level of spillover, would 
arise but without all companies entering it. Only some would be able to join together and 
benefit from R&D cooperation. They benefited from higher profits and from R&D of other 
companies  which  reduced  their  production  costs  and  they  also  produced  more  output. 
Nevertheless, networks also depended on how companies manage the RJV. The formation 
and maintenance of a network depended on what were the entrance and exit decisions defined 
by  firms.  As  seen  before,  there  were  types  of  decisions  that  leaded  to  easier  network 
formation  and  others  did  not.  Depending  on  what  were  the  minimum  requirements  for 
companies to belong to the network the easiest or more difficult, networks were arranged.  
By comparing the two approaches – symmetric vs. asymmetric production costs - we reached 
the conclusion that the second one was more close to reality. In both cases the number of 
firms in the network kept stable but on the first model companies entered into the network 
regarding any kind of situation while in the second model there was entrance only for some 
levels of spillover and in only some circumstances making the simulation more alike to reality 
firms’ behaviour.  
But, whatever the approach was, the gains to companies that joined the network were higher, 
as R&D cooperation was a way of improving efficiency on companies that joined the RJV. 
And its impact on profits was showed vital to their performance on the model. 
In spite of exhibiting some limitations (e.g. by considering only asymmetry in production 
costs, and excluding asymmetric spillovers between firms), this research could be improved in 
some directions. One possibility is to introduce endogenous spillovers between firms, that is, 
the level of spillover among firms could depend on their location, the R&D investment made 
by each firms, etc... Another possibility is to consider vertical links between asymmetric firms 
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Algorithm - Part I  
CoopR - Repeated Cooperation Game  
Initialization: set up of simulation parameters a, b (equations 1 and 2), beta (equations 3 and 
others); Marginal costs C (equation 3), R&D costs γ (equation 5); The outputs Q and q and 
R&D investment X are set up as vectors with Normal distributions (equations 3, 4 and 6); The 
individual profit ￿i and the networks’ profit have been set up respectively in 2 and zero. 
Repetition of the Game (Cycle) 
Repeat for all generations { 
Repeat for all firms in the market { 
2.1. Compute investment in R&D 
2.2. Compute individual profit 
2.3. Compute network profit  
2.4. Compute possible profits by considering the entrance in the network or the exit of a firm 
of the network 
2.5. Cooperation decision: test conditions (7), (8),(9) to verify if new firms enter in the 
network or if there are firms that want to get out of the network 
2.6. Output decision (qi*) 
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Appendix 2: Algorithm - Part II 
 
Coop1R - Repeated Cooperation Game  
Initialization: set up of simulation parameters a, b (equations 1 and 2), beta (equations 3 and 
others); Marginal costs C (equation 3), R&D costs γ (equation 5); The outputs Q and q and 
R&D investment X are set up as vectors with Normal distributions (equations 3, 4 and 6); The 
individual profit pi and the networks’ profit have been set up respectively in 2 and zero. 
Repetition of the Game (Cycle) 
Repeat for all generations { 
 2.    Repeat for all firms in the market { (for each set of equations that represents 
each number of possible members of the network)  
2.1. Compute investment in R&D 
2.2. Compute individual profit 
2.3. Compute network profit  
2.4. Output decision (qi*) 
2.5. Compute possible profits by considering the entrance in the network or the exit of a firm 
of the network  
2.6. Cooperation decision: test conditions (7), (8) and (9) to verify if new firms enter in the 
network or if there are firms that want to get out of the network 
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